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The emergence and empowerment of Sahrawi civil protests and pro-independence activism inside 
the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan occupation have to be seen in the context of varying 
sets of opportunity structures which this peripheral movement has actively seized in the past two 
decades by symbiotically combining domestic nonviolent resistance and international ‘diplomatic’ 
activities. Different forms of recognition received from the two reference centres – the Moroccan 
state and the Polisario Front – plus the international community have been crucial in this process, 
with the last representing the most significant achievement of the movement. The Arab Spring has 
been a particularly fruitful window of opportunity in this regard. Building on comparatively rich 
mobilization structures at local, inter-Sahrawi, Moroccan and international level, Sahrawis have 
successfully been able to frame the local Gdeim Izik protest in a favourable universalistic paradigm 
which has enhanced their international standing, while opportunities have broadened relatively also 
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Sahrawi civil protests in the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan control intensified just before 
the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia. Indeed, the Sahrawi protest camp set up at Gdeim Izik, 
Laayoune, in October-November 2010 was described by some observers in hindsight as the first 
chapter of the Arab uprisings (Errazzouki, 2012). Not only was this protest based on the physical 
occupation of a public space in a nonviolent but resolute way (‘occupy’ tactic) (Dann, 2014), but also 
the demands made brought together socioeconomic grievances and an all-encompassing 
nonmaterial call for ‘dignity’ (‘karama’) in a similar manner to other Arab Spring revolts. Nonetheless, 
there were also quite distinctive features resulting from a context of mixed decolonization and 
identity conflict,i along with Moroccan occupation of the territory. These peculiarities included the 
Sahrawi nationalist framing that was to be gradually imposed on events and the camp’s distance from 
the city centre of Laayoune, where the level of security control would have never allowed it to have 
been established. The unique political environment of Western Sahara certainly shaped an ‘Arab 
Spring of a different kind’ (Pace, 2013), in which popular demands for dignity, justice and freedom 
revolved more around the consequences of the protracted conflict than around primarily anti-
authoritarian claims. 
 
This Sahrawi protest appears to be evidently peripheral in three ways. Besides being marginal in both 
geographical and political terms – physically remote from any plausible state/regional ‘centre’ and 
usually out of the international media’s focus and political agenda – it remains exceptional because of 
the persistent constraints inflicted by protracted conflict and occupation. Hence both distance and 
difference (Huber and Kamel, this volume) feature prominently in this periphery. At the same time, it 
should be noted that the centre of gravity of the conflict has gradually shifted ‘inwards’ over the last 
two decades: from the international/diplomatic arena – the UN-led negotiations between Morocco 
and the exiled Polisario Frontii – to the disputed land where it started, that is the now Moroccan-
occupied territory, where the Sahrawi population has been transformed over the years into a 
demographic minority. The Arab Spring period represents the latest, albeit unique, phase in this 
process. 
 
What seems somehow more problematic to establish is in relation to which specific centre(s) this 
periphery has defined itself and constructed its identity over years. This is a crucial question because 
of the inherently relational and relative nature of the notions of centre and periphery, which are 
dependent on interaction and also subject to change (Huber and Kamel, this volume). Unlike other 
territorial peripheries studied in this special issue which define themselves in relation to a distinct 
state centre (Suárez Collado, this volume) or a set of concentric circles (Bergh and Rossi-Doria, this 
volume), the protest actors inside Western Sahara have built their political identity and struggle upon 
relations and transactions with two disparate – and indeed opposed – centres: Rabat and Tindouf, i.e. 
the capital of the occupying and administering state and the refugee camps in south-western Algeria 
where pro-independence Polisario Front established its headquarters and proclaimed the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (RASD) in exile in 1976. Moreover, both of these centre-periphery 
relationships are dynamic structures: the intensity and content of interactions which determine 
distance in each of them have varied since the start of the conflict. Administrative and economic 
dependence on the Rabat centre has not prevented distance from the Tindouf centre from being 
reduced in terms of communication and political identity over the last two decades. 
 
This article tries to understand how the ‘inward turn’ of the conflict was achieved by pro-
independence Sahrawi activists operating inside the occupied territory; in other words, how such a 
politically peripheral community – even in the context of the Sahrawi camp – was able to become 
relatively empowered and central to the conflict. From the viewpoint of these actors, this counter-
hegemonic process can be analyzed as a struggle for recognition (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1996) vis-à-
vis three significant others: the two reference centres – the Moroccan state (Rabat) and the Polisario 
Front (Tindouf) – plus the international community. Thus, the argument put forward is that the 
empowerment of this periphery was made possible not only by variations in the opportunity 
structure, mainly at the Moroccan state level, which were actively seized by the internal Sahrawi 
activistsiii through a novel combination of domestic nonviolent resistance and international 
‘diplomatic’ activism, but also that the recognition achieved through these strategies was crucial in 
this process.  
 
Research has tended to overlook the central issue of recognition. While some recent works have 
focused on Sahrawi nonviolent resistance (Stephan and Mundy, 2006; Mundy and Zunes, 2014; Dann, 
2014), they have not fully disentangled two aspects: first, the role played by Morocco’s partial and 
flawed recognition policies in enabling and fuelling such activism and, second, the symbiotic 
relationship between this domestic struggle and recognition from the international community, 
which is the necessary ‘mirror’ which has allowed it to come into existence and gain significance. This 
article therefore argues that the achievements of internal Sahrawi activists should be assessed 
primarily in terms of recognition. The Arab Spring context, in the wake of the local protest of Gdeim 
Izik, was particularly conducive to this process as it broadened opportunities at Moroccan state level 
while reviving the international community’s interest in human rights in Western Sahara. 
 
In addition to social movement theory (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 1–17; Tarrow, 2003: 19–
25) and Eduard Azar’s theory of ‘protracted social conflict’ (1990), these arguments draw on Hegel-
inspired theories of recognition, which underscore how any individual or collective agent depends on 
social interaction with (and feedback from) other subjects in order to gain self-consciousness, that is 
to create and preserve its own identity. Self-descriptions or self-interpretations always need to be 
acknowledged and validated by external others. Alongside (1) the most elementary sense of 
recognition as acknowledgement of an agent’s very existence and distinct identity (cognitive 
recognition), this strand of literature distinguishes between three key psychological or emotional 
dimensions: (2) respect (recognition of equal status and rights), (3) esteem (recognition of difference) 
and (4) empathy (recognition through understanding and affection) (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1996; 
Thompson, 2006; Lindemann and Ringmar, 2012: 7). Thomas Lindemann further adds an 
instrumental or strategic component found in cases in which recognition entails some kind of 
material advantages (2010: 2–3) – which is also reminiscent of Nancy Fraser’s emphasis on the 
connection between recognition and redistribution (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
 
The bulk of the fieldwork for this article was conducted in June 2013 in a ‘peripheral centre’ (Huber 
and Kamel, this volume): the city of Laayoune, which is the capital of the territory under occupation, 
remains largely isolated and is hardly accessed by foreigners. This is, on the one hand, a particularly 
unfavourable and under-researched environment (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: xxxiii) where the 
movements and contacts of any visitor are constantly controlled by the Moroccan security services, 
while widespread fear and paranoia among the local population (of all political leanings) create a 
tense and charged atmosphere. On the other hand, Sahrawi activists are extremely welcoming and 
eager to meet any external observer or supporter as a result of their political strategy and pressing 
need for recognition. The work mainly involved semi-structured individual or group interviews with 
representatives from some ten independent Sahrawi civil society organizations based in this city, 
most of who broadly supported the independence of Western Sahara.  
 
This article is structured as follows. The first section will place the Sahrawi ‘Arab Spring’ in the context 
of a continuously evolving inward-shift of the conflict. It will show how changing opportunity 
structures – specifically five windows of opportunity of which the Arab Spring represents the latest – 
were seized by internal Sahrawi activists. The second section will then turn to a deeper examination 
of how Sahrawi strategies capitalized on existing mobilization structures at local, inter-Sahrawi, 
Moroccan and international level during the Arab Spring. It will show that, in contrast to other 
peripheries treated in this volume, these comparably developed mobilization structures enabled 
internal Sahrawi activists to achieve a relatively important subjective outcome. This result is discussed 
in the concluding section, stressing the relevance of the recognition obtained from the Moroccan 
state, the Polisario Front and the international community. 
 
1. Changing opportunity structures and the Sahrawi ‘Arab Spring’ 
 
Five windows of opportunity can be identified within the chronology of the internal Sahrawi pro-
independence movement, which Sahrawi activists have seized over the last three decades. The Arab 
Spring was the last of them, and while it might not necessarily have been the most important, it 
provided unique opportunities for a transforming Sahrawi activism. While the contingent 
empowerment of Sahrawi activism has been facilitated in each phase mainly by different recognition 
policies of the occupying state, the exceptional feature of the aftermath of the latest protest cycle has 
been the relative easing of the level of Moroccan repression, accompanied by a revived interest on 
the part of the international community in human rights in Western Sahara.  
 
A short chronology of a conflict shifting ‘inside’: 1991, 1999, 2004, 2009  
 
The situation in the occupied Western Sahara territory in the 1980s and even the 1990s was one of 
virtual isolation, including a deep disconnect between Sahrawis who had remained there and the 
Tindouf centre of pro-independence struggle: ‘This created a real break-up. We had a society that 
was divided into two and each part evolved separately’ (Interview III, 2013). However, a first window 
of opportunity opened at the beginning of the 1990s, facilitated by the UN-sanctioned ceasefire and 
Settlement Plan (1991) accepted by Morocco and the Polisario Front, which provided for a 
referendum on self-determination, as well as a state-wide process of political liberalization launched 
by the Rabat authorities. Although it was a far cry from genuine democratization, the significant 
broadening of civil liberties and expansion of the public space witnessed in the 1990s did have a 
tangible impact on the development of civil society in Morocco and, albeit in a far more limited and 
slower way, in occupied Western Sahara. 
 
This mix of factors led to two novel developments on the ground. First, UN involvement in the conflict 
and the mere establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 
Laayoune encouraged a part of the Sahrawi population that had stayed silent under Moroccan 
occupation to express its grievances timidly. Second, in June 1991, a number of Sahrawi political 
prisoners and ‘disappeared’ were for the first time released – and thus acknowledged to exist, 
entailing recognition by the Moroccan regime in the most elementary sense. Some of them seized 
the opportunity of a ‘fully transformed social context’ (Gimeno, 2013: 13) and created informal 
groups, which merged into the so-called Coordination Committee of Sahrawi Victims of Enforced 
Disappearances in 1994. Furthermore, first attempts at networking with Moroccan and international 
actors started with a clandestine expedition from this periphery to the Rabat centre (Martín Beristain 
and González Hidalgo, 2012, vol. 2: 229, 444). 
 
A second window of opportunity related to changes in the Rabat centre opened in the run-up to the 
succession to the throne in 1999, which was surrounded by an all-pervasive discourse of change and 
had a deep impact on the perceptions of political opportunities: ‘I think this opening-up exists. 
Mohammed VI is not Hassan II, it must be said. If we say that both are the same, it means that we are 
not “historical”’ (Interview III, 2013). Memory policies and redress for human rights abuses during the 
‘years of lead’iv took centre stage in the promised ‘democratic transition’ and unleashed unintended 
dynamics within Moroccan civil society. At the same time, after the historic wave of protests which 
started in Laayoune in the autumn of 1999, when the disproportionate repression of a peaceful sit-in 
by Sahrawi students expressing social demands led to violent riots lasting several weeks (Shelley, 
2004: 115–121; Smith, 2005: 557; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 11–13), a new era of appeasement and 
conciliation with the Sahrawi population was announced, coinciding with King Mohammed VI’s tacit 
disengagement from the Settlement Plan roadmap. The idea of a ‘third way’ (autonomy under 
Moroccan sovereignty) towards the resolution of the conflict also made headway in Moroccan 
society. In sum, the Sahrawis were the target of unprecedented recognition measures in the sense of 
both respect (equal rights) and esteem (difference). 
 
Within this climate, the Forum for Truth and Justice (FVJ), founded in 1999 by the most militant 
Moroccan human rights defenders, was unprecedentedly open to Sahrawi activists. This initiative of 
independent civil society within the Rabat centre had a significant impact on the Western Sahara 
periphery and on centre-periphery relations. In August 2000 a Sahara Section of the FVJ was 
established in Laayoune, thus becoming the first formal, fully operational and legal independent civil 
society organization in the occupied territory to be made up of Sahrawis, simply ‘because the FVJ was 
an association of victims, that is the difference’ (Interview III, 2013).v In parallel, also strictly Sahrawi 
groups continued to arise, seizing the opportunity. The Coordination Committee sent a vanguard 
group to Rabat in 1998 to build networks with representatives of foreign embassies and some 
Moroccan media, political parties and civil society organizations (Interview VI, 2013) and, one year 
later, submitted a joint application detailing some 1,200 files of human rights violations to the 
Independent Arbitration Committee set up by Mohammed VI (Martín Beristain and González Hidalgo, 
2012, vol. 2: 267–269). 
 
The third turning point in the evolution of the internal Sahrawi pro-independence movement came in 
2003 at a particularly critical juncture at the diplomatic level when the Moroccan regime rejected the 
Baker Plan II,vi which was interpreted as a sign of its fear that the independence option might win in a 
final referendum (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008: 191–192; Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 8–14 
November 2003). The acceptance of this plan by the Polisario Front turned the tables (Zoubir and 
Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004: 68) and placed Rabat in the awkward position of being seen as a 
‘spoiler’ by the international community. From this moment onwards, Morocco changed strategy and 
started openly to promote a permanent autonomy solution that excluded the holding of a self-
determination referendum. This substitute step towards recognition of Sahrawi difference within a 
Moroccan state framework was coupled with a more supposedly equal cross-Moroccan form of 
recognition of rights, namely the establishment of a widely publicized Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission (IER) in 2004. However, in the end the gap between the victims’ expectations and the 
results of this flawed experience of ‘transitional justice’ proved to be large (Suárez Collado, this 
volume), especially for the Sahrawis who accounted for 23 per cent of complainants, and a precious 
opportunity for recognition was lost: ‘We were treated like numbers’ (Interview VI, 2013).vii  
 
The reaction by Sahrawi victims/activists to this new and paradoxical opportunity structure enabled 
by the Rabat centre was to create the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Gross Human Rights 
Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) in early May 2005, as well as strong protests 
and riots which came to be called the Sahrawi ‘Intifada’.viii Apart from its magnitude in terms of 
participation, extension over time and geographical scope, what made this protest cycle in the 
Western Saharan periphery different was the open use of pro-independence symbols and slogans and 
the unusual degree of attention received from the international media (Gimeno, 2013: 23). Both 
novelties were crucial for the elementary cognitive recognition of internal Sahrawi groups by the two 
significant others besides Morocco: the Polisario Front (the Tindouf centre) and the international 
community. In face of this, the Rabat centre chose to resume and upgrade the previous combination 
of the autonomy roadmap plus the spirit of ‘reconciliation’ (recognition of difference) by establishing 
a Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), which drafted a formal Autonomy Plan for 
Western Sahara.ix On the ground, the post-‘Intifada’ stage was characterized by a relative decrease in 
repression and diminution in the isolation of the occupied territory as a result of the activists’ 
growing use of new technologies and media, more frequent visits by foreign observers or supporters, 
as well as invitations to prominent internal Sahrawi leaders to participate in events abroad – the last 
constituting indications of recognition in the form of empathy. In October 2007, some figures from 
this well-connected associative elite (and former members of the dissolved FVJ-Sahara) officially 
founded the Collective of Sahrawi Defenders of Human Rights (CODESA), which would subsequently 
become a key organization (Interview X, 2013). 
 
In 2009, two changes at international level opened up a fourth window of opportunity:  the 
appointment of a new personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara, the American 
Christopher Ross, and the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States; while these 
changes represented a source of uncertainty for Morocco, they were viewed as an opportunity by the 
Sahrawi camp. Domestically, a dramatic tightening up was observed in Moroccan security control and 
rhetoric towards the Western Sahara population in response to unprecedented inter-Sahrawi 
reconnection between this periphery and the Tindouf centre. The first ‘official’ visit by seven Sahrawi 
pro-independence figures from the occupied territory to the Tindouf refugee camps in September 
2009x confirmed and formalized their equal recognition (in the sense of respect) by the Polisario 
Front. The Rabat centre’s repressive turn and the ensuing contraction of public space were explicitly 
reflected in Mohammed VI’s warning on the anniversary of the Green March (6 November): ‘(…) 
There is no more room for ambiguity or duplicity: either a citizen is Moroccan or he is not. (…) Either 
one is a patriot or one is a traitor’ (Mohammed VI, 2009).xi The most immediate consequence was 
the crisis that erupted in mid-November when the Moroccan authorities refused to allow Aminatou 
Haidar (CODESA) to enter Laayoune on her return from a trip abroad, expelling her to the Canary 
Islands (Spain). Her hunger strike challenging her deportation was not only successful in prompting 
U.S. diplomatic intervention and reversing the Moroccan decision, but also highly profitable in terms 
of international recognition since it brought the internal Sahrawi activists an extraordinary level of 
external attention (cognitive recognition) and recognition in the form of empathy. 
 
2010–11: Local and Arab Springs 
 
The fifth and last turning point in this chronology can be associated with the protest cycle of the 
Sahrawi camp of Gdeim Izik in October-November 2010 and the subsequent regional political 
transformations following the Arab Spring. Some international commentators such as Noam Chomsky 
went so far as to argue that peripheral Gdeim Izik had been the first chapter of the Arab Spring 
(Errazzouki, 2012), while others maintained that the Arab Spring did not affect Western Sahara, 
judging by the ‘semblance of stability and calm’ that prevailed there for some time after this protest 
cycle (Boukhars, 2012: 4–5). The latter assessment, however, underestimates three issues which 
closely linked Gdeim Izik to the Arab Spring and which will be discussed below: first, the similarity of 
demands and type of activism of Gdeim Izik with those of other Arab Spring protests; second, the 
significance of Gdeim Izik for the Moroccan Arab Spring and vice versa; and third, the use of the Arab 
Spring by Sahrawi activists as a way of framing their ongoing protests in order to garner international 
attention and recognition.  
 
The camp in the outskirts of Laayoune was originally set up by a group of disgruntled Sahrawi youths 
and unemployed graduates as a reaction to the irregular distribution of hundreds of plots of land for 
construction by the city council, which was criticized as having clientelist and electoral purposes (in 
the run-up to local elections in 2009). In the middle of a restrained but fierce power struggle between 
the ‘wilaya’ (provincial administration) and the Laayoune city council, not only did the ‘wali’ 
(provincial governor) first encourage unrest against the mayor, but he also later turned a blind eye to 
the rapid expansion of the camp, thus creating an unexpected and precious political opportunity for 
protest at local level. The number of ‘khaimat’ (tents) and demonstrators swiftly multiplied.xii 
 
The camp founders cautiously avoided displaying flags or giving it an explicit nationalist or pro-
independence flavour, although they linked their complaints concerning housing and employment to 
alleged discrimination against ‘true Sahrawis’ indigenous to the territory. The Moroccan Ministry of 
the Interior agreed to negotiate with the protesters’ Dialogue Committee and a basic agreement was 
reached which addressed their socioeconomic demands. However, the limit of politicization seemed 
to have been exceeded and the camp was forcibly dismantled overnight on the following day (López 
García, 2011). The justification provided by Rabat authorities was, as stated in a parliamentary report, 
that ‘the instrumentalization of social demands served outside political agendas seeking to generate 
violence and thus internationalize and perpetuate the camp’ (Au Fait Maroc, 13 January 2011).xiii This 
intervention by the security forces provoked chaos, rioting and violence which spread to the city of 
Laayoune, resulting in 13 casualties (11 Moroccan policemen), acts of vandalism and reprisals 
between Sahrawis and Moroccans. The ‘fragile coexistence’ between the two communities appeared 
to have been broken by mounting ‘ethnic tensions’ (Gómez Martín, 2012). Thus, while the Gdeim Izik 
protest was similar to other Arab Spring protests in the appearance of the demands (socioeconomic 
grievances which seemed quickly ‘politicized’)xiv and the forms of collective action (the ‘occupy’ 
tactic), it ended up reinforcing the unique nature of the conflictual context within which it took place. 
 
At the same time, peripheral Gdeim Izik arguably played an indirect role in the Arab Spring in the 
Rabat centre. Sahrawi activists did not get involved in the pro-democracy protests organized by the 
20 February Movement in Morocco in 2011, which represents a major difference and draws a dividing 
line with the behaviour of more indisputably ‘Moroccan’ peripheries such as the Rifian one (Suárez 
Collado, this volume). Conversely, the 20 February Movement did not engage with the Western 
Sahara issue in its political agenda because of its highly sensitive and divisive nature. However, if only 
as a pretext, the process of accelerated constitutional reform launched by Mohammed VI in response 
to new domestic and international pressures was officially justified by the long-promised process of 
‘advanced regionalization’, which in turn largely resulted from the Sahara autonomy project and 
growing unrest in Western Sahara. A Consultative Commission on Regionalization (CCR) had been 
established in January 2010, charged with drafting and submitting this regionalization project to the 
King. Nonetheless, neither the new constitution approved by referendum in July 2011 
(Theofilopoulou, 2012) nor the CCR plan (Interview IV, 2013),xv which soon became deadlocked, 
brought about substantial institutional changes beyond the declaratory effect. 
 
Conversely, the 2011 reform at the Rabat centre that had a more concrete impact on the ground in 
the Western Sahara periphery was the transformation of the old Consultative Council on Human 
Rights (CCDH) into the National Council on Human Rights (CNDH), which was formally more 
independent and prepared to propose measures towards the equal recognition of rights (respect) for 
the Sahrawis. The first recommendations of the new body included the grant of a royal pardon to 190 
prisoners considered to be political, including Sahrawi pro-independence activists. Furthermore, the 
CNDH set up regional commissions all over the country, three of which were located in the Western 
Sahara territory (Boukhars, 2013: 4). The aim was to mitigate the ‘problem of lack of intermediaries’ 
between the Moroccan authorities and the Sahrawi population (Interview II, 2013), that is, in centre-
periphery relations. When interviewed, the President of the CNDH Regional Commission 
acknowledged the special situation of dealing with human rights violations occurring within a context 
of ‘political conflict’ and emphasized the difficult intermediary role played by his institution, not least 
since it lacked the power to enforce its own recommendations (Interview XIV, 2013).  
 
Apart from that, the Arab Spring stage in this periphery was characterized by the recovery of previous 
levels of freedom of movement and a new expansion of public space, following the obstacles faced in 
2009 and 2010. An increasing number of delegations of internal Sahrawi activists was able to travel to 
the Tindouf camps and to international meetings, just as more foreign observers, journalists, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians and supporters arrived in Laayoune (Gimeno, 
2013: 40). Most importantly for the international recognition of internal actors, in November 2012 
Christopher Ross became the first personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara 
ever to visit the specific territory in dispute – and not only Rabat, Tindouf and Algiers as his 
predecessors had done (Lakome, 21 December 2012). This generated an extraordinary pride as well 
as mounting expectations among the activists who met him (Interview VI, 2013; Interview VII, 2013). 
In all of these interactions, Sahrawi activists appropriated the Arab Spring label and used it as a 
universalistic framing for their protests (Interview VI, 2013; Interview X, 2013), which might have 
helped them at international level to strengthen the demand to extend the mandate of MINURSO to 
monitor human rights in both Western Sahara and the refugee camps, as (unsuccessfully) proposed 
by the U.S. to the UN Security Council in April 2013. Several Sahrawi interviewees of different political 
persuasions positively stressed the greater, ‘never expected’ U.S. involvement in these human rights 
issues. ‘The U.S. Embassy knows more about our work than the Moroccan authorities themselves’, 
said the president of the CNDH Regional Commission (Interview XIV, 2013). Thus, the regional Arab 
Spring context helped Sahrawi activists to increase international recognition for their positions, 
making up for continuing strain in relations with the Rabat centre.  
 
2. The capitalization of existing mobilizing structures during the Arab Spring  
 
This transformed structural context sat well with the type of activism which the transforming Sahrawi 
movement had followed over the past years, and indeed strengthened it. Two prominent strategies 
and repertoires of collective action stand out in the recent development of the internal Sahrawi pro-
independence movement: nonviolent resistance and protests inside the occupied territory on one 
hand and ‘international diplomatic activities’ (Taras and Ganguly, 2006: 32) on the other. This was 
enabled by the availability of pre-existing mobilizing structures within/for this periphery – meso-level 
groups, organizations and informal networks (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 3) – which can be 
located on four different levels: Sahrawi civil society operating locally in the peripheral Moroccan-
controlled territory itself; the larger transnational inter-Sahrawi sphere also encompassing actors 
from the Tindouf centre, the Polisario Front and the diaspora; a limited part of civil society and 
institutional actors from the Rabat centre; and international civil society. 
 
Within the Western Saharan periphery, the basis for the mobilizing structures was provided by civil 
society organizations which share the characteristic of operating without legal recognition, as their 
bids for legal status have been irregularly rejected by the Moroccan authorities under different 
pretexts (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 97–108). This lack of equal status does not mean that their 
activity is strictly clandestine, but does make them subject to regular harassment and arbitrary 
repression. Another prevalent trait is the focus on the universalistic sphere of human rights, with the 
two most relevant human rights organizations being ASVDH and CODESA. ASVDH, which claims to be 
the civil society organization to develop the broadest grassroots activity in the occupied territory 
(Interview XVI, 2013),xvi devotes its everyday work to documenting and spreading information on 
human rights violations, which is often supplied to foreign NGOs and governments (the annual 
human rights reports the U.S. State Department regularly acknowledge this source). Therefore, its 
most significant contribution within the Arab Spring context was a thorough report on the Gdeim Izik 
events (ASVDH, 2011) which helped to set a Sahrawi narrative on this contested episode and was 
given credibility and relayed by international NGOs and the media. In the case of the CODESA, the 
focus was rather placed on ‘elite work’ (Interview X, 2013) and international advocacy and 
denunciation,xvii although a similar report needed also to be drafted on Gdeim Izik (CODESA, 2011). 
 
Beyond the human rights sphere, politically relevant and active internal Sahrawi organizations include 
the Committee for the Defence of the Right to Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara 
(CODAPSO),xviii the Committee for the Support of the UN Settlement Plan and the Protection of 
Natural Resources of Western Sahara (CSPRON) and the Trade Union Confederation of Sahrawi 
Workers (CSTS). CODAPSO and CSPRON share an explicitly ‘political’ pro-independence stance and an 
emphasis on (or specialization in) the issue of the Moroccan exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural 
resources, which occupies an increasingly prominent place on the diplomatic agenda of the broader 
Sahrawi movement and benefits from the effective international support of the NGO Western Sahara 
Resource Watch (WSRW) (Interview VIII, 2013; Quarante, 2014). Major efforts made by these 
organizations include the campaigns organized in 2011–12 against the fisheries and agricultural 
agreements between the EU and Morocco. The trade union CSTS, which was officially created in 2007 
by former mine workers from Fos Boucraa but is open to members from other sectors and 
unemployed graduates, is also heavily involved in this international ‘economic’ struggle (Interview XV, 
2013).  
 
An effective division of labour exists between all of these groups (focusing on international advocacy, 
human rights, victims and their families, natural resources, unemployed graduates or other specific 
social problems) and, besides a dense social fabric and key individual networks, formal coordination 
occurs between organizations at local level within the so-called ‘tansikiyat’ (coordination 
committees). The Laayoune ‘tansikiya’ is made up of some 15 groups which meet with essentially two 
purposes: the preparation of joint demonstrations and planning of the reception of foreign 
delegations (Interview VI, 2013).xix In fact, both kinds of action have been strategically related in 
recent years, with local protests being staged to coincide with foreign visits, as well as key diplomatic 
junctures such as the annual renewal of MINURSO’s mandate by the UN Security Council. For 
example, a significant protest cycle took place in different Western Saharan cities in April–May 2013 
not only in protest against the failure to extend MINURSO’s mandate to human rights, but also 
encouraged by the unusual arrival of foreign observers and journalists.  
 
Furthermore, the pro-independence groups from occupied Western Sahara are no longer isolated 
from the exiled population in the Tindouf centre and the Polisario Front. Technological and 
communicational factors, and more specifically the spread of mobile phones and internet 
connections, contributed more than anything to ‘breaking the wall’ and reducing the distance 
between this periphery and this centre, as well as with the Sahrawi diaspora.xx This and other 
increasingly frequent transnational contacts and exchanges of all kinds (human rights associations, 
trade unions, youth organizations, media, family visits) have arguably helped to consolidate a shared 
‘Sahrawi political identity and political project’ (Barreñada, 2012). At least at the societal level, they 
have fostered a growing recognition of hitherto peripheral internal Sahrawis by their compatriots in 
exile in the sense of empathy. Nonetheless, concrete ‘political’ inter-organizational links with the 
Polisario remain opaque and ambiguous (Gimeno, 2013: 36). Unlike the Moroccan official discourse 
which maintains the absolute identity of the external ‘enemy’ and its domestic ‘fifth column’ 
(Interview IV, 2013), activists from internal Sahrawi groups largely emphasized their organizational 
autonomy.xxi The bottom line is that there is ‘sympathy and harmony on goals’ (Interview V, 2013), or 
a broad identity-driven ‘political alignment’ (Interview III, 2013), but no organizational or dependency 
relationship between Sahrawi actors in Laayoune and Tindouf (Interview X, 2013). Despite this, the 
2009 visit to Tindouf certainly broke a taboo by officializing the recognition of internal activists by the 
Polisario. The growing formalization of contacts was to turn into equal participation in political bodies 
two years later, when the 13th Polisario Popular General Congress, held in Tifariti in December 2011, 
for the first time officially included a delegation of activists from occupied Western Sahara.xxii 
 
The role played by this transnational inter-Sahrawi network with regard to internal Sahrawi activists 
in the context of the Arab Spring involved recognition, backup and framing. Different signs of 
recognition were given in the sense of respect (recognition of equal status) and empathy (recognition 
through understanding and affection), yet always avoiding esteem (recognition of difference) for the 
sake of the unity of the larger Sahrawi movement. Backup was visibly provided by the spread of 
information and the placing of a growing official emphasis on human rights violations and resistance 
in the occupied territory, which were now established by the Polisario as a major bone of contention 
with Morocco at diplomatic level, together with the demand to extend MINURSO’s mandate to 
human rights. Although they should not be fully dismissed outright, Moroccan suspicions of material 
support or funding for internal Sahrawi activism have not been backed by evidence. Framing entailed 
placing all manifestations of internal Sahrawi activism within the unifying framework of a single 
Sahrawi nationalist struggle, as happened for the Gdeim Izik protest. 
 
As regards the interaction between the peripheral internal Sahrawi movement and the Rabat centre, 
the activists’ relations with a limited number of Moroccan, ‘Moroccanized’ or somehow intermediary 
actors, placed halfway between Rabat and Laayoune, have also proved to be relevant. Among civil 
society organizations, the pioneering Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) stands out as a 
taboo-breaking exception due to its simultaneous work at Moroccan state level and in the occupied 
territory, which has however come at the expense of constant internal rifts. The AMDH branch in 
Laayoune is open to activists of all political persuasions, but is in practice mostly made up of 
Sahrawis, many of whom combine this membership with parallel engagement with other 
associations, most notably the CODESA. As a result, it has been subject to official harassment akin to 
that of pro-independence groups (Interview XI, 2013). In practice, the AMDH is used as a ‘node’ or 
interface between Sahrawi and Moroccan civil society, for example, in the context of the follow-up 
committee on the recommendations of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) or 
campaigning against the military trial of 25 Gdeim Izik activists in February 2013. 
 
At institutional level, the main intermediary actor in these centre-periphery relations since the Arab 
Spring has been the CNDH Regional Commission in Laayoune (Interview XIV, 2013), even though 
Sahrawi activists perceive their access to this Moroccan consultative body as a double-edged sword. 
Some of them refuse all cooperation since the CNDH does not meet the international standards for 
national human rights institutions (Paris Principles) and its Laayoune branch is led by co-opted 
Sahrawis, while others maintain personal contacts with its officials, recognizing their good faith but 
limited room for manoeuvre (Interview X, 2013) in securing practical improvements for the human 
rights situation in the territory (treatment of detainees, prison conditions, replacement of certain 
security officials). At a more individual level, an also widely recognized ‘nodal’ or bridging role is that 
played by former Polisario dissident and member of Moroccan parliament Gajmoula Bint Ebbi 
(Progress and Socialism Party, PPS) who, despite her involvement in Moroccan institutional politics, is 
said by some to have ‘always been with the Sahrawis’ (Interview VI, 2013). Interviewees 
acknowledged her positive contribution as part of the official team that negotiated with the Gdeim 
Izik protesters in November 2010, her subsequent bold denunciation of the forcible dismantling of 
the camp and her personal support for the activists who faced military trials along with their families 
(Interview I, 2013). 
 
The specific international connections and networks that can be viewed as integral to the mobilizing 
structures of the internal Sahrawi movement include most notably foreign advocacy groups and 
NGOs. Some relevant state diplomatic representatives, in particular those of the U.S., British and 
Swedish embassies in Rabat, have shown a growing willingness to establish direct contact with 
Sahrawi human rights activists. However, their job is largely limited to that of observers or 
interlocutors. More active or overt support work is carried out at the level of civil society through 
international networks which partially overlap but do not conflate themselves with those backing the 
Polisario and the Tindouf refugees. The more visible and effective partners nowadays are the 
international human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the U.S.-
based Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights (RFK Center) and the network Western 
Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW). These advocacy groups serve as interfaces between local activists 
and international institutions, and lobby in three crucial arenas: the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), 
the U.S. Administration and Congress, and the European Parliament. 
 
For instance, CODESA co-drafted with the RFK Center and five other international organizations a 
joint report on the human rights situation in Western Sahara which was submitted to the ‘troika’ in 
charge of the HRC’s Universal Periodic Review of Morocco in May-June 2012.xxiii At the end of that 
year, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture Juan E. Méndez visited Morocco and Western Sahara to 
prepare another report for the HRC which was in no sense indulgent with the Rabat authorities 
(OHCHR, 22 September 2012). The lobbying of the RFK Center, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch was instrumental in pushing the Obama Administration and its UN Ambassador to 
circulate a draft Security Council resolution in April 2013 seeking to extend MINURSO’s mandate to 
human rights monitoring (although it was ultimately unsuccessful). One year later, Aminatou Haidar 
again requested the same measure in the U.S. Congress (SPS, 24 March 2014). As regards WSRW, it 
played a decisive role in the campaign that ended with the European Parliament’s rejection of the 
protocol of extension of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement in December 2011 due to, among other 
things, persistent legal doubts regarding the inclusion of the territorial waters of Western Sahara.xxiv 
In 2012, another resolution of the European Parliament expressed ‘concern at the deterioration of 
human rights in Western Sahara’ and called for the ‘release of all Sahrawi political prisoners’ 
(European Parliament, 2012). 
 
3. Outcomes and conclusions 
 
Assessments of the results to date of the internal Sahrawi pro-independence movement’s domestic 
and international strategies vary greatly depending on the point of view. As in the cases of most of 
the peripheries addressed in this special issue, the outcomes seem meagre from a structural and 
‘objective’, ultimately external perspective (Huber and Kamel, this volume). Protests in occupied 
Western Sahara have certainly not led to better socioeconomic conditions or greater political 
autonomy for the territory, nor have they increased the chances of a global resolution of the conflict 
according to these actors’ preferences (self-determination) in the international diplomatic sphere. 
The Gdeim Izik protest and the subsequent Arab Spring developments stopped short of changing the 
foundations of Moroccan regional and local governance. Neither the new 2011 constitution nor the 
regionalization project that accompanied it at the Rabat centre brought about substantial 
institutional changes. The reform of the Political Parties Act approved in October 2011 did not lift the 
existing ban on the formation of parties on an ethnic or regional basis. The below-average abstention 
rates recorded in these ‘southern provinces’ in 2011 in both the July constitutional referendum and 
the November legislative elections could well be used to legitimize the status quo (Boukhars, 2012: 
4–5). 
 
Nonetheless, there is also some room for optimism, as the international pressure on the Moroccan 
authorities obtained by internal Sahrawis has lately brought about some tangible changes in centre-
periphery relations. As recently confirmed by leaked confidential documents of the Moroccan 
diplomacy, President Obama put forward three specific demands to King Mohammed VI during their 
meeting in Washington in November 2013: to put an end to military trials for civilians, to allow the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Western Sahara and to legalize Sahrawi associations 
such as ASVDH and CODESA.xxv Steps towards the fulfilment of the first two requests were taken in 
March and May 2014, respectively (Yabiladi, 14 March 2014; OHCHR, 29 May 2014). As regards the 
legalization of associations, it was the subject of a recommendation by the CNDH according to a trial 
balloon issued in late 2013 (EFE, 20 November 2013), but it has not materialized to date. 
 
The strategies of the internal Sahrawis during the Arab Spring appear to be most successful when one 
considers these actors’ ‘subjective’ accounts and the extent to which they perceive that their self-
descriptions or self-interpretations have been acknowledged and validated by external others. That is 
to say, their outcomes as a periphery need to be judged first and foremost in terms of the recognition 
gained – or seized – from three significant others: the Moroccan state, the Polisario Front and the 
international community. The Rabat centre might have been the most prolific promoter of policies of 
recognition towards this periphery, from equal human rights initiatives to recognition of difference 
and material reparations. However, as they have taken place against the backdrop of structural 
misrecognition of the Sahrawis entailing an essential lack of respect or equal status (human rights 
violations, repression of pro-independence activists, no legal recognition for Sahrawi civil society 
organizations), these partial actions have been flawed by an inherent mismatch with the self-identity 
of the target actors. They have thus been largely ineffective if not ultimately counterproductive for 
Moroccan interests. 
 
Conversely, the internal Sahrawi activists have achieved growing cognitive recognition (attention) and 
respect (equal status) from the Tindouf centre and relevant international actors, including the UN and 
the U.S., as well as considerable empathy from inter-Sahrawi and foreign civil society. Cautious 
optimism prevailed in the responses provided during the author’s interviews, based above all on the 
movement’s successes in the Arab Spring context in making its voice heard and achieving a certain 
impact in international fora, hand in hand with its international support and advocacy networks. 
However excessive the activists’ expectations of future influence on the U.S. Administration and the 
European Parliament may seem, their ‘subjective’ views do reveal the invaluable significance of these 
international connections and achievements, if only for their coming-into-existence and the assertion 
of a long-denied identity. This suggests some parallels with the internationalisation strategy followed 
by the Palestinians since 2011, with the UN statehood bid as the most emblematic measure, although 
the extent of this inspiration is qualified by the Sahrawis’ more peripheral position, lack of an 
internationally recognized state-like ‘authority’ and less developed foreign networks. 
 
While the larger and complex reconstruction of Sahrawi communal and/or national identity which 
appears to have been underway since the turn of the millennium falls beyond the scope of this 
article, it seems clear that each of the above-mentioned forms of (mis)recognition has had a distinct 
impact on the dynamics of identity-construction of the internal Sahrawis. Most conspicuously, the 
Moroccan (depoliticized) recognition of Sahrawi cultural difference has accidentally fostered an 
ethnicization that transcends colonial territorial demarcations, while the international recognition of 
internal Sahrawi civil society has encouraged the latter to concentrate on universalistic issues such as 
human rights and the exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied territory, even more so 
since 2010–11 in order to accommodate and capitalize on the Arab Spring framing. 
 
Altogether, this article has shown that the emergence and empowerment of internal Sahrawi pro-
independence activism has to be seen in the context of varying sets of opportunity structures actively 
seized by this peripheral movement over the last two decades through the symbiotic combination of 
domestic nonviolent resistance and international ‘diplomatic’ activities. The Arab Spring has offered 
the latest window of opportunity in this chronology and Sahrawis have successfully been able to 
frame their protests within this paradigm. Building on comparatively rich mobilization structures at 
local, inter-Sahrawi, Moroccan and international level, internal Sahrawis have been relatively more 
effective than other peripheries treated in this volume at garnering international recognition, which 




In memory of Lahcen Moutik who passed away in December 2013, a few months after our interview. 
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i
 See the classification of conflicts in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 76). 
ii
 Sahrawi national liberation movement fighting against Moroccan presence in Western Sahara and recognized 
by the UN General Assembly in 1979 as ‘the representative of the people of Western Sahara’. 
iii
 In this article the term ‘internal Sahrawi’ is applied to civil society, organizations, groups, activists and leaders 
operating inside Western Sahara occupied territory, which self-define as ‘Sahrawi’ and broadly favour 
independence, in order to emphasize the distinction between them and their counterparts in the refugee 
camps of Tindouf or the diaspora, which is central to the argument. For an overview of Sahrawi civil society in 
the Tindouf camps, see Darbouche and Colombo (2011). 
iv
 A period of heightened state violence against political opposition under the reign of Hassan II, from the 1960s 
to the 1980s. 
v
 The Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) had also opened a pioneer office there shortly before, 
but at that time only included members of Moroccan origin. Viewed as increasingly menacing by the Rabat 
authorities, the FVJ-Sahara was eventually dissolved by the Laayoune Court of First Instance in June 2003 on the 
grounds that it used ‘human rights as a cover to pursue both violent and diplomatic “separatist” activities’ 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008: 99–101). 
vi
 The Baker Plan II represented a polished proposal for a mixed solution combining a stage of transitory 
autonomy with a final referendum on self-determination. 
vii
 Not only was the Western Sahara territory excluded from the collective reparation programme designed for 
some regions, but also the public hearing scheduled in Laayoune was eventually cancelled (Vairel, 2006: 243). 
‘The IER rather than addressing the particular breadth of violations suffered by Sahrawis, increased their 
feelings of marginalization’ (Amnesty International, 2010: 269–275). 
viii
 In late May, a small rally in Laayoune opposing the transfer of a Sahrawi prisoner to Agadir resulted in an 
unprecedented cycle of demonstrations, repression and riots after it was violently broken up by the Moroccan 
police (Mundy, 2007; Smith, 2005: 546, 558; Interview XII, 2013). 
ix
 The Autonomy Plan was to be submitted to the UN in March-April 2007, and was backed up by an ambitious 
diplomatic offensive. 
x
 The meeting organized in September 2009 stemmed from an initiative of internal groups later adopted by the 
Polisario (Interview III, 2013), which resulted in the arrest of the activists on their return to Laayoune, amid a 
climate of Moroccan patriotic outrage. In spite of the obstacles faced, this ground-breaking visit set a precedent 
and was to become the first of a handful of journeys to Tindouf in subsequent years. 
xi
 This address was highlighted as a pivotal fact almost unanimously in the author’s interviews (for example 
Interview XIII, 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
xii
 Some estimates refer to around 6,500-8,000 tents and 20,000-25,000 protesters (Gómez Martín, 2012). 
xiii
 See also Lakmahri and Tourabi (2013). 
xiv
 The distinction between socioeconomic and ‘political’ protest is widespread in the literature on the Arab 
Spring and social movements in this region (Bergh and Rossi-Doria, this volume). For a critique of the ‘hierarchy 
of struggles’ implicit within this dichotomy, see Bogaert (2014: 2–4) and, in the case of Western Sahara, see 
Veguilla (2009). 
xv
 A draft regionalization bill following the recommendations of this Commission was presented by the 
Moroccan government in the summer of 2014. 
xvi
 Set up in 2005 by former members of the Coordination Committee, ASVDH is characterized by its self-
definition as an ‘association of victims’. Although all legalization procedures established by the Moroccan 
Association Law were followed, the Moroccan authorities continued to treat it as an ‘unrecognized’ 
organization. ASVDH has sections in several cities of Western Sahara as well as southern Morocco (Barreñada, 
2012), but its failure to secure normalization has prevented it from having a proper membership record, so in 
principle ‘any victim can consider himself/herself as a member’ (Interview VI, 2013). 
xvii
 CODESA was formally created in 2007 as the successor of the former FVJ-Sahara, although the Moroccan 
authorities prevented its founding congress from being held and refused to legalize it, arguing that its principles 
undermined the state’s ‘territorial integrity’ and that its focus on the Sahrawi population amounted to 
‘discrimination’. Due to this legal situation, the only internal body established within the organization is a 14-
member secretariat (bureau). The three tasks performed are assisting the victims of violations to file both 
lawsuits and complaints with the CNDH, preparing annual and thematic reports concerning the human rights 
situation in Western Sahara, and carrying out international advocacy work (Interview X, 2013). 
xviii
 CODAPSO was founded in April 2005 by the renowned Mohammed Daddach, the longest Sahrawi prisoner 
of war held by Morocco (1976–2001) and former Polisario Front fighter, in response, he said, to ‘the Moroccan 
propaganda regarding the Autonomy Plan’ (Interview VII, 2013). 
xix
 Another local ‘tansikiya’ was operating in the city of Smara at the time of Christopher Ross’ visit in October 
2013. The only relevant group that prefers to stay out of these inter-organizational networks is the CODESA 
(Interview X, 2013), which suggests a subtle strategic and tactical cleavage with the other leading organization, 
the ASVDH. The opposition between grassroots activity vs. ‘elite work’ and promotion vs. rejection of local 
inter-organizational coordination roughly describe the acknowledged differences between their respective 
approaches. This is coupled with some inevitable competition for domestic leadership and international 
attention and recognition at both individual and organizational level, even though in general cooperation visibly 
prevails over tensions or fragmentation. 
xx
 In the early 2000s, the use of mobile phones started to become widespread, rendering futile the previous 
restrictions on international calls from landlines in the occupied territory, while the internet entered the scene 
with the appearance of the first cybercafés. Later on, in 2009, another powerful vehicle for inter-Sahrawi 
reconnection in the media sphere came with the launch of regular RASD TV broadcasts from Tindouf, which 
soon became the most widely watched channel in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (Interview IX, 
2013). 
xxi
 Two vital yet somehow contradictory discursive red lines were at stake here for a mixture of 
pragmatic/tactical and principled/identity reasons. On the one hand, any questioning of the unity and 
unanimity of the broader Sahrawi movement is avoided as being detrimental to the nationalist struggle and the 
preservation of the legal self-determination framework, to which pro-independence Sahrawis of all sides 
remain attached. On the other hand, any acknowledgement of integral connections with the Polisario would 
play into the hands of the Moroccan authorities, giving them a pretext to justify harsher repression of internal 
activists. An additional more identity-related explanation is that the internal groups’ own search for recognition 
also discourages them from blending themselves in with the Polisario. 
xxii
 The 54 members of this delegation, who belonged to organizations such as CODESA, CODAPSO, ASVDH and 
CSPRON, were involved in the so-called Commission of the Occupied Territories and the Intifada of 
Independence (SPS, 20 December 2011), and participated in all votes on an equal footing with the other 




 However, a new fisheries protocol was signed and adopted by the European Parliament and Council at the 
end of 2013.  
xxv
 See, for example, the letter from the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to King Mohammed VI, 3 February 
2014, available at http://www.4shared.com/web/preview/pdf/Um3bkoJvce. 
